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ABSTRACT 
 
This study assesses herding behaviour and how it occurs on the separate Nordic stock markets of Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark during the time period of 2007-2018. Herding can be characterised as investors 
abandoning their own initial vision and then following a common market consensus. This behaviour can be 
categorised as either rational or irrational. 
 
The study utilises the CSAD methodology established by Chiang and Zheng (2010) to detect market-wide 
herding during the chosen sample period of 2007-2018. The method comprises calculating the non-linear 
relationship between dispersions of individual asset or stock returns compared to the full market portfolio 
return.  
 
When observing the entire sample period, none of the selected markets, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, display 
herding behaviour. When exposed to subsample testing, where the entire sample period is divided into one-
year periods, results demonstrate that Sweden experienced herding behaviour in 2013. Additionally, the 
study finds evidence that herding is most likely to occur there on down-market days. Finland nor Denmark 
display significant herding on either the entire sample period or during subsample periods. Moreover, 
Finland or Denmark did not display significant herding occurring on either up- or down -market days. This 
study also recognises the importance of the US and European markets on smaller markets. It is found that 
Denmark in particular is prone to herding around the German and US markets. Furthermore, stock return 
dispersions from the US and Germany affect all of the three selected markets. Empirical results suggest that 
Sweden displays the most significant evidence of herding for the entire sample period according to all of 
the different regression estimates which were tested. 
 
These results are partially inconsistent with previous studies. The greatest contribution this study makes is 
the observation of why results are inconsistent particularly in Finland. It is suggested that the difference in 
time periods renders different results. This in extension would suggest that at least the Finnish stock market 
has developed over the course of time and does not suffer as extensively from market anomalies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Collective fear stimulates herd instinct and tends to produce ferocity toward those 
who are not regarded as members of the herd.” (Russell 1901) 
 
 
Should humans still be seen as merely animals, who want to be a part of a larger pack and 
not stand out individually as Russell suggests. Can an argument be made, where people 
base their judgements on the decisions made by others rather than thinking for 
themselves? Consider the situation of choosing where to eat or which movie to watch. 
Many gourmands and cinephiles alike have a basic instinct of first surveying reviews 
online – which restaurant has received the most starts on TripAdvisor, and which movie 
has been awarded the best score on Rotten Tomatoes. How many would take the risk of 
choosing a restaurant or a movie with a rotten score? Most likely the choice would be 
made to eat or watch something what other people have suggested and enjoyed. 
 
Although these are extreme examples, the same fundamental idea can plausibly be applied 
to investor behaviour on the stock market. Investors tend to buy stocks, which have 
received buy or add ratings from stock analysts. Moreover, large-cap companies who 
enjoy considerable prestige attract inexperienced amateur investors to make their first 
stock market purchases on their shares. This decision to buy and follow the example of 
others is exactly what investor herding is about: Investors blindly following decisions 
made by others before them and not coming to their own conclusions by assessing 
individual stock characteristics. This behaviour can and ultimately does change the 
structure of stock markets and drive the prices of stocks away from their fundamental 
values. But a single investor making a buy or sell decision is not enough to result in an 
act of herding. Herding occurs when a mass of investors simultaneously, or almost 
simultaneously, make a sell or buy decision in acceptance of a broad and general market 
consensus.  
 
This study aims to firstly explain what herding is in context of the stock market. The 
reasons behind herding behaviour are also examined. Furthermore, models assessing 
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herding are inspected: Are these models adequate and have they accumulated consistent 
results?  It can shortly be said that herding behaviour has been studied by a plethora of 
researchers internationally. So far, the Nordic market has however received rather little 
attention. This paper aims to compile all noteworthy studies and compare them with 
empirical results and research conducted by this study. The research will be thorough and 
meticulous, where the three Nordic markets of Finland, Sweden and Denmark are 
inspected. The presence of herding is inspected during the entire sample period of 11 
years (1/1/2007-31/12/2017) and during separate years during the entire time period.  
 
During the selected time period the financial market experienced major turmoil in form 
of the Financial crisis in 2008 and the Euro Crisis of 2012. The market also experienced 
a record braking incline. This will make the inspection of this particular period extremely 
fascinating as the market was far from being dull and steady. Additionally, specific 
examination of herding in regard to up- and down-market days is made.  An abundance 
of studies has found that investors herd differently in dissimilar market conditions.  
 
This herding instinct has been found accountable for even deepening crises in addition to 
mangling stock prices (Christie and Huang 1995; Spyros 2014). The logic behind this 
assumption is easy to grasp. When everyone is panicking and selling in a market crash 
situation, wouldn’t one’s own first instinct be to also do this and sell all shares? When the 
parameter of risk in the risk/reward equation is realised how many can hold their ground, 
stand firm and hold on to their stock capital? Naturally, it is easy to beforehand laugh and 
despise the fools who panic, when the stock market hits a slump, and say that I would 
never fall for such nonsense. But when an investor has his or her own money at stake 
would it be so easy to withhold from following this herd of panicking investors?  
 
This herding behaviour can also be turned the other way around. When, for example, 
Apple releases their latest smartphone and tech journalists and analysts alike suggest that 
this telephone will beat all prior sales records. Would it then be logical and 
recommendable to buy Apple shares, despite nothing fundamentally changing in the 
company? Would it be an act of intellect or an act of investor herding? 
 
9 
 
The reasons behind selecting this particular topic are very simple. Investor behaviour is 
always a current issue. Understanding how investors act or react may give another 
enlightened investor insight on how to exploit this behaviour. Furthermore, human 
behaviour as a field of study is particularly interesting. Why do we do the things we do? 
This question of humanity is rather broad and will not be answered, at least fully, in this 
paper.  But the topic is interesting to study even in a narrower sense: Why do investors 
do the things they do?   
 
This concept is commonly contemplated vis-à-vis investors. What makes a certain stock 
continue to decline even though there are no fundamental and apparent reasons to this 
occurrence? Similarly, why do vast amounts of investors trust a certain electric car 
company to deliver on their promises despite there not being any proof of this ever 
happening. Another example could be the huge expansion of the bitcoin market of recent 
years where apparently many, or should we say, a herd of, investors simultaneously 
thought that it was a great investment opportunity. The evidence is quite clearly as to 
whether or not this herd of investors had the correct assessment.  But these examples just 
simply come to show how investor behaviour is an extremely interesting and intriguing 
topic and should be studied further. This is also what motivated this paper to study the 
herding behaviour of investors on the Nordic stock markets, where research has not been 
as extensive as on other international markets. 
 
 
 Purpose of the study 
 
This study aims to explain what herding is in the context of the stock market – what the 
actual concept means and how different researchers have studied it. Also, this study will 
explain how it is assessed and detected through different models and what the actual 
impact of herding is, according to these specific models. Previous main studies and the 
framework established by them in addition to their main findings will also be discussed.  
In continuation, the study will also present an overview of previous studies conducted on 
the Nordic stock markets.   
 
10 
 
These previous results will, together with results from this paper, be used to assemble an 
extensive compilation of how herding occurs on the three selected markets. Furthermore, 
the purpose is to explain if herding is persistent through the entire sample period or 
conversely during specific years or in fluctuating market conditions. Also, it is 
demonstrated if Nordic markets herd around international markets. It will also be assessed 
if herding is similar between Finland, Sweden and Denmark or if there is a difference 
between the markets. Additionally, the purpose is to see if results for herding are 
consistent with previous studies. 
 
 
 Previous main studies 
 
Previous main studies discussed in this paper include a large variety of studies. Studies 
by especially by Christie, W., Huang, R. (1995), Chang, E., Cheng, J. and Khorana, A. 
(2000), Hwang, S., Salmon, M. (2004) and Chiang and Zheng (2010) will be discussed 
intensively in order to establish a framework to asses herding in this study.  Also, other 
noteworthy main studies by Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny R. (1992) and more 
recently by Spyros, S. (2014). 
 
Furthermore, research on specifically Nordic markets will be covered. Main studies 
include interpreting the findings of Saastamoinen (2008) and Mobarek, A., Mollah, S., 
and Keasey, K. (2014). Additional insight will be provided by international research on 
developed markets. Also, some masters’ theses’ results will shortly be discussed to 
provide minor evidence for Nordic markets, as most international research so far have not 
included studying Nordic stock markets. These theses will provide some slight 
comparison of results, where there is a lack of data for these specific markets. 
 
 
 Intended contribution 
 
The main contribution of this study is to demonstrate how herding occurs on the Finnish, 
Swedish and Danish stock markets. Contribution also lies with demonstrating how 
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herding has or hasn’t changed in separate years during the sample period. The study will 
also inspect if there is asymmetry between up- and down- market days between the three 
markets. Another contribution of this study to the existing literature, is to provide results 
with the latest data for the Finnish, Swedish and Danish stock markets. Additionally, 
insight of Nordic markets herding around the US and German market will be provided. 
The chosen time period of 2007–2018 provides interesting insight into recent turbulent 
time periods and can examine herding during the Financial and Euro crisis but also the 
relatively stable upheaval and inclining time period following both crises. There are only 
a few studies which have studied the time period around the financial crisis and to the 
best of my knowledge no study has as updated data as this paper. 
 
 
 Limitations and assumptions 
 
Limitation of this study lies in the data and the chosen time period. The study only 
inspects the indices of the most traded stocks of the three selected markets in Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark (OMXH25, OMXS30 and OMXC20 respectively). Herding 
behaviour might differ if the entire market for all markets would have been chosen. 
Another limitation is the seclusion of Norway entirely. Furthermore, the chosen time 
period has not been researched extensively and comparing results with other studies is 
not possible for the entire sample period. The assumptions of this study are that the data 
gathered is accurate and does not display false information. Another assumption to the 
study is that the method chosen to detect herding is correct and truly displays the existence 
or nonexistence of herding. 
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2. WHAT IS HERDING?  
 
 
 Herding 
 
Human herding is not a novel idea conjured up by economists or an act which only occurs 
in the stock market and acted by investors. Conversely, it is in addition to zoology, a 
comparatively well studied and extensively debated subject in psychology, neurology and 
sociology (Spyros 2014: 175).  The actual and initial act of herding refers to animals, 
assembling to from a group in order to follow each other. This same phenomenon can be 
seen in humans as well, for example voters falling behind a political candidate, or masses 
of teens following trend setting fashion stars. It is often mentioned that people indeed 
want to be led and shown the way.  This type of behaviour can also be examined and seen 
on the stock market.  Avery and Zemsky (1998) suggest that this type of behaviour is 
embodied when investors abandon their initial assessment and strategy and follow trading 
trends made by previous traders. This in turn causes investors to wander aimlessly and 
follow market trends without purpose. Shiller (2015) paints an even more sinister and 
dismal picture of investors, where they are regarded as sheep who follow a herd without 
any understanding of their own.  
 
Bikchandani and Sharman (2001) define herding as the correlation between individual 
investors’ causal investment decisions. What this actual means is, that herding would be 
defined as investors making an investment decision based on earlier investment decision 
made by other investors. This concept of herding on the financial markets can be 
challenging to explain. The description changes and shifts with each research and 
researcher. Some researchers have an extremely detailed description of herding, where a 
pinpointed act of investors is only seen as herding itself and everything else is 
disregarded. Others oppositely have a broad and general approach towards herding.  The 
difference in the two definitions can arguably and quite naturally be caused by the type 
of research conducted. The first mentioned researchers having a detailed description have 
inspected herding on an individual level – what causes an individual to follow a specific 
market consensus. Secondly, the other group assesses herding as a market-wide 
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phenomenon, where the research question is most commonly addressed to answer the 
question of do a certain group of investors commit to the act of herding. This latter 
research question is also discussed in this paper, where the objective is to see and find, if 
market-wide herding occurs on the three Nordic markets of Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark. 
 
The topic and act of herding has been keenly researched after the Financial crisis of 2008. 
Especially the impacts and effects of herding towards financial markets have been of 
special interest. Investors, be it institutional or nonprofessional, displaying symptoms of 
herding can cause market inefficiency and even lead to pricing bubbles (Spyros 2014: 
178).  Herding might cause an inflation of some certain stocks, industries or markets 
where the market price of the asset is shifted and twisted from its fundamental value to 
such an extent that it forms a pricing bubble. Naturally researchers have been trying to 
find material reasons as to why herding occurs as the behaviour might cause enormous 
market disturbances (Bikhchandani and Sharkma 2001).  
 
Empirical analysis and methodology can coarsely be broken into two categories: 1) 
models which suggest that herding is actually rational and voluntary and 2) models which 
asses herding as non-rational and involuntary behaviour (Spyros 2014:176).  This creates 
a problem for researchers trying to make and compile an all-encompassing and detailed 
definition for herding. Moreover, the act of herding might have changed during the 
passage of time. Investors might display certain types of herding behaviours differently 
or not display previously detected herding symptoms at all. This paper itself suggests that 
herding behaviour might have changed in Nordic markets during the 21st century. 
Additionally, the comparison of results between studies becomes challenging because of 
this problem with time. Some models have not been updated to utilise current datasets, 
which makes the comparison of results difficult (Spyros 2014: 176). 
 
Yet another difference between studies is the target group of herding analysis. Some 
studies research herding within a certain small group of investors, for example hedge fund 
managers or stock analysts. Meanwhile, other studies have investigated herding as a 
market-wide phenomenon which disregard groups and sees investors as a whole (Spyros 
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2014: 179). Combining all of the afore mentioned differences and coming up with a 
theory of everything for herding has not been accomplished by any prior study.  
Furthermore, the empirical evidence of herding even occurring on financial markets is 
inconclusive (Cipriani and Guarino 2014; Spyros 2014). 
 
From such a short introduction, it is already plain to see that herding is by no means an 
ease concept to grasp even though the initial thought would be the opposite. Herding can 
not only be defined as irrational, foolish investors shouting “sell, sell, sell”, but rather as 
a behaviour and act of investors, which occurs on all different levels of the financial 
markets, between small groups and as a market-wide phenomenon. It can of course 
happen during turbulent and stressful market situations but also during times of market 
boom. This lastly mentioned positive affair could even suggest that herding might have 
some rationale behind it.  
 
 
 The rationality of herding 
 
Hence, after some discussion and assessment of the irrational aspect of herding, some 
light should be shed on the rational side of herding. This argues the question of can there 
be a rational explanation as to why some investors herd and follow a market consensus. 
Researchers have suggested that under some circumstances herding could be a rational 
and even voluntary act (Spyros 2014: 177). Consider a situation where a stock analyst 
comes to the conclusion that all of his fellow colleagues have made an incorrect 
assessment of a stock, and then this individual stock analyst deviates from the common 
consensus. Following this decision, the individual analysts later finds out that he was the 
only one that made the wrong prediction and all the other analysts where right all along. 
In a worst-case scenario this individual stock analyst might even face a problem of 
employment following this wrongful decision. Could one then argue that had he or she 
just followed the common consensus, or the herd, of other analysts the outcome would 
not have been negative. The act would have been less risky and might have been even 
rational. Another example could be applied to a poor performing hedge fund manager. 
Could he or she turn the course of performance by just imitating other successful and 
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triumphant hedge fund managers. In these two examples the act of herding and following 
of others to gain better outcomes does actually sound logical and rational. This would 
argue that herding can actually in many cases be a justified, conscious and rational 
behaviour. 
 
Thus, herding can be divided into two different and separate categories, where the first 
category is intentional and true herding. The other category is unintentional and spurious 
herding which some would suggest fill the definition of blind and irrational herding. The 
firstly named, intentional and true herding is the type of herding where an investor 
abruptly abandons his or her initial vision and decides to copy the actions and behaviour 
of other investors consciously and intentionally. This is the type of herding which most 
individuals initially think herding to be, where an individual for no apparent reason 
decides to follow a group of others. This decision could be influenced by a multitude of 
separate or connected reasons. These could include the belief of others having more 
information or knowledge, a reputational issue or simply not trusting one’s own 
assessment. This behaviour can however lead to a deduction of market inefficiency, 
where investors simply follow actions of other investors. (Bikhchandani and Sharma 
2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) 
 
The secondly mentioned unintentional and spurious herding, is a phenomenon where a 
group of individuals separately come to the same conclusion and act in the same manner 
unbeknownst of the actions of the others.  The objective is the opposite of intentional 
herding where the aim is to not follow others, but to act in a way which can produce profit 
and exploit the gap of knowledge in other investors. This type of behaviour can even have 
some egoistic characteristics to it, where an investor thinks that he or she has come to a 
novel conclusion and decides to act upon it in order to gain something. When many 
investors come to this same conclusion and then simultaneously act upon it, unintentional 
herding is achieved. This is a great example of efficient markets, where an infusion of 
recent news and decision-making leads individual investors to make a parallel move. This 
phenomenon makes the financial markets even more efficient (Bikhchandani and Sharma 
2001). An example of this type of behaviour could be displayed by a sudden rise of 
interest rates by a non-specific central bank. This could indicate a development of a 
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booming market or raise the desire to invest in interest-based products. This might cause 
many investors to change investment plans and switch up their portfolios. They did not 
however do this because other investors did it but simple because of the possibility of 
benefitting from new information.  These findings might suggest that intentional and 
unintentional herding have a difference in the timing of the said phenomenon, where in 
intentional herding an investor comes to the decision later and only after others have 
already made it and vice-versa in unintentional herding an investor believes that he or she 
has made the investment decision before anyone else. 
 
 
 First assessments on herding 
 
The assessment and examination of herding was first started by Lakonishok et al. in 1992, 
when they inspected the occurrence of herding between pension fund managers. Their 
study found little to no evidence of herding. They however suggested that unintentional 
herding was greater in large-cap companies than in smaller companies.  Their thought 
being that information on larger companies was more readily and extensively available 
when compared to smaller companies. This in turn would lead investors to come to a 
unilateral decision even individually as they all have the same information readily 
available (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001). This argument is logical and makes sense. 
Larger companies are followed by many investors and stakeholders. The information flow 
is constant, and many investors can easily come to a similar conclusion and make a 
decision upon it, which would ultimately result in unintentional herding. Oppositely, 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) also suggested that smaller companies had a bigger risk of 
experiencing intentional herding which is consistent with the logic of Bikhchandani and 
Sharma (2001). News flow from smaller companies is not as constant as from larger 
companies. Smaller companies are not as intensively followed by stock analysts and even 
the opinions and statements of a single investor might have huge consequences on the 
stock performance of that particular company. This two-way division of herding has 
further been expanded and developed by later studies to include more intricate 
descriptions and definitions of certain types of unintentional or intentional herding.   
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2.4. Dividing herding 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Division of herding (Bikhchandi and Sharma 2001; Spyros 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1 displays how herding can be divided. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) break 
intentional and true herding up into irrational, not fully rational and rational herding. The 
first, rational herding, can be even further divided into subcategories which include 
herding based on information, reputation and compensation. This compensational aspect 
can be seen to mean herding which is deeply connected to employment. The division 
could be viewed as an arbitrary grouping of herding, but essentially it exists to ease the 
separation of definitions of different forms of herding. This separation in turn makes 
different and specific forms of herding easier to study. 
 
Going through the various subcategories of intentional herding displayed in Figure 1, we 
first assess irrational herding. Irrational herding is grounded in the psychology of an 
investor, where he or she makes an unconscious and involuntary decisions (Shiller 2015: 
Herding
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165). These types of investors are prone to making abrupt, surprising and poor investment 
decisions, which are mainly based on missing information.  Spyros (2014) states that 
irrational investors make decisions because of ulterior pressure from either social circles 
and stigmas. Baddeley (2004) further suggests that even experienced and professional 
investors may falter to irrational herding when given a scarcity of information. Irrational 
investors commonly make investment decisions based on a market consensus or even 
trends propagated by the media.  
 
For example, in October of 2017, the tele network company, Nokia’s, stock price dropped 
from €5.10 to €4.21 (Yahoo Finance 2018). This decline could partially be blamed on 
headlines propagated by the media to spike the interest of readers. Kauppalehti for 
example, stated with a front-page headline that over a billion euros had vanished from 
Nokia´s funds (Hurmerinta 2017). The share price was already experiencing a decline 
before the headlines on that day, and these new stories certainly did not have a stabilising 
effect on investors. An irrational investor could see this new development as a signal of 
the company’s future struggles and decide to sell of their shares.  
 
This behaviour serves as a prime example of herding where investors had initial thought 
that Nokia would be a profitable investment but after media attention and market 
consensus, many decided to abandon all hope in the company even though none of the 
fundamental values of the company had changed. Nokia’s stock price had recovered from 
this drop by May of 2018 (Yahoo Finance 2018).  After the drop, many stock analyst 
houses, such as Inderes (2017) reacted by saying the dip in share price was an over-
reaction by the market. They responded by giving Nokia a strong buy recommendation 
(Inderes 2017). 
 
Another subcategory of intentional herding is not fully rational herding. This type of 
herding can partially be seen as a momentum investment strategy, where investors trade 
shares according to historical performance (Bikchandani and Sharma 2001: 282). Not 
fully rational herding already as a term sets in between irrational and rational herding. 
Investors rationally attempt to mime earlier historical profits gained by others but 
irrationally conduct this behaviour because there is no present-day proof which would 
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suggest, that what has happened in the past, will also be true in the present or the future. 
Observably, the investor attempts to profit, and exploit actions made by earlier investors.  
This behaviour can however morph and develop into rational herding if the investor does 
achieve profits and gains from exploiting earlier patterns (Bikhchandani and Sharma 
2001: 282). Here the investor has successfully followed earlier and historical market 
consensus deliberately, even though there was no guarantee that this strategy would yield 
the desired results 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates how the third category of intentional herding, rational herding, can 
be divided even further into three subcategories: information-, reputation- and 
compensation-based herding. Informational herding is displayed when an investor has a 
firm belief that other investors have better insight and knowledge of the market 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001). Information based herders then follow the investment 
decisions made by other investors deliberately and intentionally. The deprivation of 
knowledge and incapability to devour new information causes an investor to believe that 
he or she must follow the example of other investors. This action could be argued to be 
rational, if an investor truly lacks the ability to make decisions for oneself and thus is 
dependent on the decisions of other investors.  
 
The last two categories of intentional herding are deeply interconnected. Reputational and 
compensational herding are both connected to employment. The reputation of an investor 
may be damaged if he or she makes erroneous investment decisions. This type of herding 
can for example be seen in stock analysts, where deviating from a common consensus of 
a company’s performance may ultimately cause the stock analyst to suffer from distrust 
from investors hoping to receive accurate predictions. Compensational herding on the 
other hand occurs when an employee’s salary is connected to his or her performance. 
Taking risks and making decisions which differ from a market consensus may ultimately 
lead to a termination of employment. Conversely following market consensus and 
copying what other investors do will serve as insurance for the employee. Naturally he or 
she will not perform better than others but at least the performance won’t be inferior. 
Furthermore, an employee’s bonuses may be connected to actually beating the market. 
Wouldn’t it then again be rational to follow the example of successful investors? Alas 
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employment based rational herding can be seen as an insurance for success and 
minimising risk (Trueman 1994; Graham 1999; Spyros 2014). In both of these types of 
herding, investors herd in order to protect their reputation and remuneration (Spyros 
2014).   
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON HERDING ON THE STOCK 
MARKET 
 
 
This chapter will establish how herding opposes the efficient market hypothesis 
(henceforth, EMH) and asset pricing models, which argue that investors are always 
rational and only act when new information is given to them. Kendall and Bradford Hill 
already discussed the random walk and unpredictability of stock prices in 1953, where 
they argued that market participants were not always rational and share prices wobbled 
like a local zythophile returning from the pub. Motivated by Kendall and Hill (1953), 
later studies conducted in the 1960’s and 70’s extensively researched their views and 
deductions about an efficient market and asset pricing (Fame 1970; Shleifer 2000). 
 
 
3.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
As a field of financial research, behavioural finance and specifically herding, has 
presented critique to the believers of traditional EMH.  These believers suggest that 
investor behaviour is always rational. It has been suggested that asset pricing analysis is 
always correct if it fully reflects all available information on the market (Fama 1970: 383) 
This deduction of correct pricing is grounded in the argument of investor rationality, 
where rational actions should always lead to efficiency (Fame 1970). Investor herding 
presents a problem for EMH and opposes the hypothesis directly.  Herding specifically 
states that investors are not rational even though they are represented with all available 
information. Conversely investors displaying symptoms of herding abandon fundamental 
asset values and act in discordance with them. 
 
Shleifer (2000 :1) separates market efficiency in to three levels: weak, semi-strong and 
strong. A market with weak efficiency will have asset pricing, which only reflects 
historical data and information. A semi-strong efficient market suggests that asset pricing 
includes and contains all and entire public information in them. The third and final level 
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of efficiency is a strong market. This type of market will contain all and even private 
insider information in an asset’s price (Shleifer 2000: 2). 
 
The EMH firmly states that investors are indeed rational. Additionally, if random 
irrational phenomena do occur, they are cancelled out by opposite adverse and irrational 
phenomena (Shleifer 2000: 1). Furthermore, EMH has a response in the instance that an 
opposite counteraction does not occur. EMH states that finally arbitrageurs will eliminate 
any and all mispricing by exploiting incorrectly priced assets. These actions should then 
ultimately restore market efficiency even though some inefficiency may occur. Widely 
used and referenced financial theories and empirical studies have at least some 
foundations in EMH (Shleifer 2000: 1), and only after the 1980’s research has shown that 
results aren’t always consistent with the EMH (Shleifer 2000: 8).  
 
Many anomalies have actually been found to consistently appear on the financial markets. 
Keim (1983) represented the well-known January effect, which showed that in January, 
daily abnormal returns are significantly higher than in other months (Reinganum 1983).  
Another example of empirical results which are inconsistent with EMH are the findings 
of De Bondt et al. (2008). They examined and represented many examples of the 
mispricing of assets of high and low price-to-earnings (henceforth, P/E) ratio companies. 
Even Fama and French (2015) demonstrated with their updated 5-factor model that not 
all assets can be priced correctly. These few studies already come to show that asset 
pricing does not follow the EMH and in continuation, that investors do not always act 
rationally. It also comes to show that one should never disregard the humane component 
in any theory or aspect of life.  
 
 
3.2. Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth, CAPM) explains the linear relationship 
between an asset’s expected returns and systematic risk. The model is based on the logic 
that an investor should be compensated by a choice of risk and return (Fama and French 
1992), i.e. an investor can choose to either expect greater returns by adding risk or vice-
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versa expect lower returns with lowering risk. The relationship can then be used to price 
different assets accordingly. In turn, this would make it easier for an investor to choose 
an asset which resembles his or her expected return and risk aversion level.  The CAPM 
equation is represented below: 
 
(1)   𝐸(𝑟)% = 𝑟' + 𝛽%(𝑟* − 𝑟') 
 
Where: 𝐸(𝑟)% = expected returns of the asset 𝑟' =  risk-free rate, normally derived from yields of government bonds  𝛽% =  beta of the security  (𝑟* − 𝑟') = market premium 
 
Although the logic and idea behind the CAPM in an investor choosing a risk/reward level 
is still applied today, the model has received warranted criticism. The market premium 
component explains the deviations of stock returns poorly and the model does not price 
assets correctly (Mergner 2009; Fama and French 2015). Hence alterations and 
expansions to the model have been suggested in order to account for these deficits. These 
alterations come in the form of different factors, which attempt to explain the effects that 
changes in an asset’s macroeconomic, fundamental and momentum values have (Mergner 
2009). 
 
The next models represented will emphasise on the fundamental and momentum factors. 
The momentum factor examines how the historical returns of an asset impacts future asset 
pricing (Mergner 2009).  In addition, the fundamental factors measure quantifiable data 
from a company, which include size, value or investment. By adding factors to a single 
factor model it naturally changes the name of the initial model. If you say add two factors 
it is obviously then called the three-factor model due to its two additional factors in 
comparison to the CAPM.  Fundament and momentum factors are arguably more 
renowned and revered in the financial community in comparison to the macroeconomic 
factor. The macroeconomic factor should not be entirely disregarded, but for the purposes 
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of this paper and length restraints, the next section will explore the other two factors and 
the three-factor model. 
 
 
3.3. Three-factor model 
 
The framework of the CAPM has later been utilised by many researchers including Fama 
and French (1992, 1993, 2015) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to comprise new factors, 
which try to price assets better than the standard CAPM. The standard CAPM 
inaccurately measures the returns of value and small-cap companies (Fama and French, 
1992). The market premium factor from CAPM cannot solely explain asset returns or 
price them correctly. Hence, Fama and French (1992) added two factors which sought to 
address the size and the value of a company and how these factors and aspects affect the 
expected returns of a company.  The size factor is named Small Minus Big (henceforth, 
SMB) and it describes how the size of a company affects its returns. Looking at past 
returns, small-cap companies have had higher returns than large-cap companies. The 
factor is equated by calculating the difference between the stock returns of small and large 
companies. (Fama and French, 1993) 
 
The other factor, value, seeks to explain how the value of a company affects the expected 
returns of said company. The value factor is named High Minus Low (henceforth, HML), 
where the difference of a low and high book-to-market value (henceforth, BV/MV) 
companies is calculated. This factor was included because higher BV/MV companies, 
also called value companies, have had significantly higher returns than low BV/MV 
companies, also commonly referred to as growth companies (Fama and French, 1993). 
The HML factor is calculated in the same manner as the SMB factor where the difference 
of returns between high and low BV/MV companies is calculated. The three-factor model 
has been one of the most utilised asset pricing models in the financial markets (Mergner 
2009: 127). The equation for the three-factor model is represented here (Fama and French 
2015):  
 
(2)   𝐸(𝑟)% = 𝑟' + 𝛽%(𝑟* − 𝑟')+	𝛽-(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽1(𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝑒5 
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Where in addition to equation (1): 𝛽-=  sensitivity of asset to SMB (𝑆𝑀𝐵) = Small Minus Big factor 𝛽1 =  sensitivity of asset to HML (𝐻𝑀𝐿) = High Minus Low factor 𝑒5 =  zero-mean residual 
 
 
3.4.  Five-factor model 
 
Fama and French (2015) also amalgamated the five-factor asset pricing model because of 
criticism directed towards the three-factor model (Titman et al., 2004; Novy-Marx, 2013). 
The model inaccurately priced aggressively investing and lower profitable small-cap 
companies (Fama and French, 2015). Fama and French claimed that by adding factors to 
the existing five-factor model they could come up with the best model despite it not being 
perfect. Alas, they added two additional factors: investment and profitability. The 
profitability factor is named Robust Minus Weak (henceforth, RMW), and it measures 
the difference between companies which have high (robust) and low (weak) operating 
profits. The investment factor is named Conservative Minus Aggressive (henceforth, 
CMA) and it measures the difference of conservatively (low) and aggressively (high) 
investing companies. The equation for the five-factor model is represented below (Fama 
and French 2015):  
 
(3)  𝐸(𝑟)% = 𝑟' + 𝛽%(𝑟* − 𝑟')+	𝛽-(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽1(𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝛽6(𝑅𝑀𝑊) +																											𝛽9(𝐶𝑀𝐴) + 𝑒5 
 
Where in addition to equations (1) and (2): 𝛽6=  sensitivity of asset to RMW (𝑅𝑀𝑊) = Robust Minus Weak factor 𝛽9 =  sensitivity of asset to CMA (𝐶𝑀𝐴) = Conservative Minus Aggressive 
 
26 
 
3.5. Herding opposing efficient markets 
 
Traditional asset pricing models, as the ones mentioned afore, completely disregard a 
human component in them. The objective is to only measure what an assets price should 
be, which is commonly in stark contrast to what it actually is. The difference can be 
caused by a variety of reasons, and one of them is human behaviour.  The models listed 
before always establish investors as being rational and only acting rationally upon novel 
information (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2009). These models also expect a linear pattern of 
expected returns (Fama 1970; Fama and French 1992, 1993, 2015), which just simply 
cannot be upheld. Nothing in nature is linear so why should the prices of assets move this 
way when they are ultimately determined by the way investors behave. 
 
Behavioural finance can be seen as a countermovement towards the linearity of asset 
pricing models which assume that the EMH is correct and investors are always rational 
(Hodnett and Hsieh, 2012). It can quickly be noticed that investors do not make trading 
decisions based on estimates from asset pricing models and seeing if there is an 
exploitable arbitrage opportunity. Many investors actually act irrationally and make 
decisions based on feelings or even hunches. Just by listening to anyone who has ever 
invested in anything, one can almost instantly hear the phrase “I just had a hunch about 
it”. Hence, there are other factors than just mathematical or measurable factors to take 
into account in addition to just the ones conjured up by Fama and French (1970, 1992, 
1993, 2015). Everything and anything an investor experiences affects his or her 
investment decisions: education, employment, media coverage, mood and even the 
weather can have an immense effect on how an investor comes to making a decision. The 
research in behavioural finance is particularly interested in this aspect of investor 
irrationality and many investor behaviours have been discovered. Herding is just one of 
the countless areas of behavioural finance. 
 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) suggest that behavioural finance derives from two areas: 
psychology and the limits to arbitrage. The latter, limits to arbitrage, partially cause 
irrational investor behaviour. They argue that the costs of transactions limit the 
opportunities of exploiting and utilising arbitrage opportunities. Additionally, risk and 
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self-doubt of arbitrageurs may cause them to not utilise all arbitrage possibilities. These 
limits to arbitrage can cause permanent mispricing of assets and ultimately inefficient 
markets. The argument opposes the EMH and the afore listed asset pricing models, which 
suggest that arbitrage should finally eliminate all ill-pricing of assets and inefficiency of 
markets (Fama 1970).  
 
Investor psychology, the second area of behavioural finance, aims to understand the 
reasons behind why investor do what they do. This area of behavioural finance also tries 
measurable assess different behaviours in order to firstly understand why they occur and 
secondly when they occur. This information could be utilised in all market conditions. De 
Bondt et al. (2007) for example suggest that financial crises may ultimately even be 
caused by investor behaviour and that investor psychology should be listed as one of the 
reasons for the deepening crises situations. Moreover, even superstar and influential 
investors state that they have made investment decisions based on decisions and 
recommendations of other investors (Devenow and Welch 1996). This fact alone clearly 
demonstrates that investors, no matter how experienced they are, don’t always act 
rationally and follow the example of others. 
 
Herding behaviour and the following of other investors has been suggested to explain 
many market anomalies and the incorrect pricing of assets. The next chapter will assess 
some of these herding models, which try to detect herding on stock markets. This 
detection of herding deeply opposes the EMH and asset pricing models discussed in this 
chapter, which state that such a behaviour shouldn’t exist at all.   
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4. ASSESSMENT OF HERDING MODELS 
 
 
The following chapter assesses some herding models. These models were constructed 
after Lakonishok et al. (1992).  The models challenge the previously discussed asset 
pricing models and stem from the observation that investors aren’t actually rational, at 
least all the time. Although most of these models have detected herding occurring in some 
instances, they can’t specifically measure what kind of an impact this has had to the 
efficiency of markets or the pricing of assets. The only statement these models can make 
is that herding does transpire.  The results which these studies compiled are discussed in 
chapter 5.  
 
It is also important to mention that the following models listed in this chapter are not the 
only models which measure herding. These models have, however, been utilised the most 
by various researchers. The results and evidence gathered by these models will also be 
discussed in a later chapter. Additionally, the model discussed in subchapter 4.3. will be 
employed in the empirical research of this paper. This is the reason as to why these models 
have been included and other models secluded.  
 
 
4.1. Linear regression model 
 
Christie and Huang (1995) employed a linear regression model to study investor herding. 
The model utilised the standard deviation of stock returns when markets were 
experiencing turbulent times. They wanted to show that investors don’t act according to 
traditional asset pricing theories but instead act oppositely and especially in market stress 
situations. The reasoning was that the irrational behaviour of investors should drive share 
prices away from their fundamentals values when investors and markets were under 
stress. The deviation of returns of stocks should diminish as investors abandoned 
individual stock characteristics and followed the market performance (Christie and Huang 
1995). This behaviour should be predominantly evident in market stress situations, when 
investors ensue to panic (Christie and Huang 1995). This would indeed determine that 
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investors are prone to herding, when they followed a market consensus and disregarded 
how an individual stock performed (Henker et al. 2006).   
 
This study was a small revelation, as it unconventionally studied herding by the standard 
deviation of returns. Many researchers and models today base their framework on the 
Christie and Huang (1995) model. Albeit, their methodology has been modified to some 
extent the similarity between methods is still evident. The criticism towards Christie and 
Huang’s (1995) model was directed especially towards the linearity of the model and its 
ability to only detect herding in certain market conditions. 
 
 
4.2. Beta coefficient model 
 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) approached herding from a somewhat different perspective. 
Their definition of herding was an investor making trading decisions from market news 
or other indicators, for example macro-economic announcements. This approach sees a 
group of investors coming to a similar conclusion by consuming new information. Hwang 
and Salmon (2004) assessed the standard deviation of the beta-component and how the 
fluctuations of it determined whether or not herding was happening. They were motivated 
to inspect if results from prior studies had been robust or not when they were exposed to 
a different model (Cipriani and Guarino 2014). 
 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) suggest that their method of assessing the beta-coefficient can 
dissect and differentiate intentional and unintentional herding. Their approach is certainly 
different than methods employed by other researchers. Here herding is seen as investors 
coincidentally coming to the same trading decision. When investors comply to this type 
of behaviour the individual betas should resemble the fluctuations of a general market 
beta consensus, i.e. when the standard deviation of separate beta-coefficients diminishes 
the market is experiencing herding. This is explained by many investors making the same 
decisions simultaneously and thus reducing the fluctuation of separate betas from the 
market norm. Their study focused on the matter of detecting comovements of betas in 
stock markets (Hwang and Salmon 2004). Investor herding means that market 
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participants aren’t keen on correct asset pricing, according to pricing models, but rather 
in share prices reflecting market returns (Hwang and Salmon 2004). This assumption 
dictates that the values of beta-coefficients change as time passes. 
 
The method at first inspects herding to a balanced state of the CAPM (Hwang and Salmon 
2004): 
 
(4)   𝐸<(𝑟5<) = 𝛽5*<𝐸<(𝑟*<) 
 
Where:  𝑟5< =  the stock i’s abnormal returns 𝛽5*< =   systematic risk  𝐸< =   expected value at time t 𝑟*<  =  market premium 
 
When herding does not occur, the share price of stock i, should only be equated from 
using the 𝛽5*< and 𝐸< values. If, however, the share price of stock i is incorrect according 
to equation (4), herding is occurring. Correct pricing and mispricing are further equated 
by using the following equation (Hwang and Salmon 2004): 
 
(5)  =>?(@A>)=>(@B>) = 𝛽5*<- = 𝛽5*< − ℎ*<(𝛽5*< − 1) 
 
Where in addition to equation (4):  𝐸<-(𝑟5<)5 = stock i’s deviation from expected abnormal value at time t  𝛽5*<- =   systematic risk at time t  ℎ*< =   latent/hidden variable to determine herding 
 
When no herding is detected on the market, the values in equation (5) should equate to ℎ*<=0 and 𝛽5*<- = 𝛽5*<. When herding is perfect ℎ*<=1 and 𝛽5*<- = 1. Then naturally, if 
only some herding is occurring for the stock i, then 0<ℎ*<<1. (Hwang and Salmon 2004) 
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4.3.  Nonlinear regression model 
 
Chiang and Zheng (2010) also research herding on stock markets. They expanded the 
framework established by Chang et al. (2000) and Christie and Huang (1995). Chang et 
al. (2000) had to some extent addressed the issue of linearity from Christie and Huang’s 
(1995) paper but according to Chiang and Zheng (2010) not all issues were completely 
resolved especially concerning asymmetric investor behaviour. Chiang and Zheng 
(2010), similarly to Chang et al. (2000), studied the absolute standard deviation of returns 
of stocks from a market portfolio. They also added a nonlinear component to Christie and 
Huang’s (1995) model. Herding should actually grow or diminish at an exponential rate 
in specific and different market conditions (Chang et al. 2000). Chiang and Zheng (2010) 
suggested that herding is most intensive when the absolute deviations of returns between 
an asset and a market portfolio decreases or increases at a slowing speed. The logic behind 
the equation is simple, if the returns of an individual asset start to follow the returns of a 
market portfolio, market-wide herding is happening as investors disregard individual 
asset characteristics and in turn follow the market performance. Their methodology can 
also assess herding in all market conditions and not only in stressful and turbulent 
situations. Moreover, compared to the study of Chang et al. (2000) they added an 
additional component to the equation in order to address asymmetric investor behaviour. 
 
Chiang and Zheng (2010) utilise the following equation to equate the Cross-Sectional 
Absolute Deviation (henceforth, CSAD) of returns at time t:  
 
(6)  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷< = FG∑ 𝑁5JF |𝑅5< − 𝑅*<| 
 
Where: 
N=  the number of companies in a portfolio 𝑅5<   the return of the stock at time t 𝑅*< =  the return of the market portfolio at time t 
 
The CSAD measure from this equation is then further utilised to detect herding by 
inserting the CSAD measure into the following equation (Chiang and Zheng 2010): 
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(7)  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷< = 𝛼 + 𝛾F𝑅*< + 𝛾N|𝑅*<| + 𝛾O𝑅*<N + 𝜀< 
 
Where: 𝛾F𝑅*<=  the asymmetry component 𝛾N|𝑅*<|= the absolute term 𝛾O𝑅*<N  = the nonlinear component 𝛼=  constant term 𝜀<=  error term at time t 
 
 𝛾O𝑅*<N  is the non-linear component of interest, which Christie and Huang’s (1995) 
method lacked. A negative and significant value of 𝛾O would be consistent with market-
wide herding. (Chang et al. 2000; Chiang and Zheng 2010). Additionally, the 𝛾F𝑅*< 
component was added by Chiang and Zheng (2010) to account for asymmetry in investor 
behaviour. 
 
This lastly mentioned model is also utilised in the empirical research part of this paper as 
it is wide used. Because of the popularity it should be easier to assess and compare results 
from prior studies compared to selecting a model which hasn’t seen as much popularity 
by prior studies. The next chapter of this paper will discuss important international studies 
and also ones conducted in the Nordic stock markets. 
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5. LITERATURE REVIEW, PRIOR INTERNATIONAL AND NORDIC 
MARKET STUDIES  
 
 
As previously mentioned, this chapter will compile the empirical results of international 
studies and also of ones which have been conducted in Nordic stock markets. The Nordic 
markets have so far seem somewhat neglected by the research community and only a 
handful of studies have absolutely concentrated on Nordic stock markets. Most studies 
have only happened to include the Nordic markets as one portion of the study and a larger 
dataset, where the main emphasis was on the European market as a whole. Because of the 
scarcity of results from Nordic markets, some masters’ theses’ results will be introduced 
as minor evidence for herding behaviour in Nordic stock markets. This chapter will not 
have an extensive overview of the methodology of each study, but rather emphasise the 
results and evidence from each paper. 
 
 
5.1. International results 
 
Christie and Huang (1995) studied herding on US stock markets in 1925 to 1988. Their 
results were, in short, inconclusive. Their results were not consistent with their claims of 
detecting herding on stock markets in turbulent and volatile conditions. Christie and 
Huang (1995) hypothesised that deviations of returns between individual assets and the 
market should diminish, and definitely not grow, as investors disregarded singular asset 
characteristics and herded around the market performance.  Their empirical results 
suggested the opposite, where deviations of returns actually increased in turbulent market 
conditions. They also observed that deviations of returns expanded substantially more in 
bear-markets than in bull-markets, which would suggest according to their methodology 
that herding diminished in reclining markets. Additionally, the evidence pointed to 
receding market pricing of assets being consistent with traditional asset pricing models 
(Christie and Huang, 1995). In conclusions, Christie and Huang (1995) found no evidence 
of significant herding occurring in the US stock market between 1925-1988. The results 
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suggested that herding was more likely to occur during bull markets rather than in bear 
markets, but these findings were not significant.  
 
Chang et al. (2000), as discussed in the previous chapter, employed a nonlinear model to 
detect herding. They studied herding from 1963 to 1997 on various international markets 
to see if there was a difference in herding between developed and emerging markets. The 
markets selected were the US, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Similarly, to 
Christie and Huang (1995), the sample period for the study was relatively long and 
would’ve provided a sufficient overview of the selected markets at that time. Chang et al. 
(2000) did not find significant evidence for herding in the stock markets of the US, Hong 
Kong or Japan. These results were consistent with the findings of Christie and Huang 
(1995). Chang et al. (2000), did however find significant evidence of herding for the two 
emerging markets, South Korea and Taiwan. Their findings were consistent for the two 
over the entire sample period and also for differently sized portfolios. Another 
observation they made, was that macroeconomic announcements and news had a more 
significant effect on herding than novel small scale and detailed market information 
(Chang et al. 2000). These findings would indicate that herding is more likely to occur on 
emerging markets rather than developed markets. These observations would also be 
consistent with evidence from Christie and Huang ‘s (1995) study. A suggested reason as 
to why emerging markets experience more herding than developed one’s could be the 
scarcity of information for investors. Detailed news reports on individual companies in 
emerging markets are not as constant as with companies in developed markets and 
macroeconomic announcements could sway investor decisions and sentiment radically.  
 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) examined herding on the US and South Korean markets 
between 1993 and 2002. They utilised the beta-coefficient model discussed in chapter 
4.2. of this paper. Their results were opposite to previous main studies. Their model 
detected herding in significant amount in all market conditions and for the entire sample 
period. Significant herding was consistent in bull- and bear-markets and surprisingly even 
diminished in declining markets. These results contradict previous findings (Christie and 
Huang 1995; Chang et al. 2000), which together only found significant herding to occur 
in emerging markets and more probably in bull markets. Hwang and Salmon (2004), 
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suggested that the asymmetry of herding between bull- and bear-markets was due to 
investors actually trusting the fundamental values of individual stocks and opposite to 
traditional view, not panicking and following market consensus. In addition to detecting 
herding in inclining and declining market conditions, Hwang and Salmon (2004) also 
found significant evidence of herding in stable markets. They argued that large 
institutional investors distributed capital between market segments according to market 
performance, which explained herding even in stable market conditions. These findings 
were inconsistent with the evidence provided by previous studies (Christie and Huang 
1995; Chang et al. 2000). The argument could be made that this was due to the difference 
of the model and methodology used to detect market-wide herding.  
 
Hwang and Salmon (2009, 2012) also specifically researched herding in turbulent market 
conditions to reinforce the findings of their previous study, which saw that herding 
diminished in bear-markets. They researched herding during the 1987 market crash, the 
1998 Russian crisis and the Financial crisis of 2008. Their results were consistent with 
their previous results, where levels of market-wide herding significantly decreased in 
turbulent markets. The results between the different studies from the same researchers 
seem to be robust and show that investors don’t only herd in declining markets. 
Oppositely, Hwang and Salmon (2004, 2009, 2012) demonstrated that investor herding 
is more likely to occur in bull-markets and when the outlook of the market is 
overwhelmingly positive. If an educated guess is to be made for the reasoning behind this, 
one might suggest that it is the urge to mimic the success of other investors. In a positive 
market surge, investors are looking to find the single most profitable asset. Then if new 
and potentially positive information is introduced to the market investors might rush, or 
herd, to act on it. This behaviour would be consistent with the already discussed definition 
of herding, where investors disregard the individual characteristics of assets and instead 
follow a common market consensus. Here in this case the belief would be that, because 
the market is surging this particular asset must also perform well. 
 
Chiang and Zheng (2010) examined herding behaviour in global stock markets by 
utilising their slightly modified nonlinear model discussed in chapter 4.4. They used data 
from 18 countries for a sample period ranging from 1988 to 2009. They found significant 
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evidence of herding occurring in all advanced and Asian markets for the exception of the 
US and Hong Kong. Additionally, they did not find significant evidence of herding 
occurring at all in Latin American markets. The difference of results for Latin American 
markets was explained to be caused by global information processing. Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) suggested that investors particularly in Asia valued information from Wall Street 
media more than other information. This processing of similar information in Asia by 
individual investors would lead to investors simultaneously reaching a similar conclusion 
and trading strategy and thus creating herding behaviour. Herding was also consistent and 
present in rising and declining markets. However, some evidence of herding asymmetry 
was found in up-and down-markets for Asian markets. Another observation was the 
contagion patterns in herding during market crisis situations, where if herding behaviour 
occurred in the country where the crisis initially began, the behaviour also spread to 
neighbouring countries. The results of the study were partially consistent with the findings 
of previous studies (Christie and Huang 1995; Chang et al. 2000; Hwang and Salmon 
2004, 2009, 2012). They opposed Hwang and Salmon (2004, 2009, 2012) by not finding 
evidence of herding behaviour in the US, but results were consistent with other sample 
countries. Oppositely to Chang et al. (2000), Chiang and Zheng (2010) found evidence 
of herding to occur in Japan. The results are inconsistent and in stark contrast to Christie 
and Huang (1995, who did not find any significant herding occurring in any markets for 
their sample period. (Chiang and Zheng 2010) 
 
International studies can be concluded with some consistency and also partial 
inconsistency. Christie and Huang (1995) examined the US market in 1925-1988 and 
found no evidence of herding and only some slight indication of insignificant herding 
occurring in bull markets. Chang et al. (2000) used a partially overlapping sample period 
of 1963-1997 and assessed herding in the markets of the US, Hong Kong, Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. They found that herding only occurred in emerging markets. Hwang 
and Salmon (2004) used an entirely different method of detecting herding, the beta-
coefficient model. The chosen sample period of 1993-2002 was only partially overlapping 
with Chang et al. (2000). They investigated the stock markets of the US and South Korea 
and found herding to occur on both and in various market conditions. These results are 
strongly inconsistent and oppose the results from other prior studies. Additionally, Hwang 
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and Salmon (2009, 2012) researched markets in crises situations and found that herding 
diminished in such times. Finally, Chiang and Zheng (2010) used a slightly altered model 
of Chang et al. (2000) and found herding to occur on most markets. The exceptions were 
the US, Hong Kong and Latin American markets. Their sample period of 1988-2009 
overlaps at least partially with most studies.  
 
In sum, emerging markets seem to experience herding most likely whereas developed 
markets are not as prone to it. Additionally, results from the same markets may change 
when exposed to different time periods and different methods of detecting herding. 
 
The differences in results between all the studies could be at least partially explained by 
a dissimilar model and a somewhat different sample period. This same issue in differing 
data and sample periods seems to challenge comparing all the results under inspection in 
this paper. By not utilising the same model to detect herding, and scientific community 
clearly not abiding by just one method, it makes the comparison between results at least 
moderately challenging.  Even though some conclusions can be drawn, a full and cohesive 
picture of investor herding cannot be painted on global markets. The next subchapter will 
compile the results of studies from Nordic countries.  
 
 
5.2. Nordic countries 
 
It would be fair to assume and quickly conclude that the stock markets of Nordic countries 
should resemble each other to at least some degree. The countries are not separated by 
long distances and share many aspects culturally. Holidays and trading days occur at 
roughly the same time, and all experience the same market crises and surges similarly due 
to their proximity. According to previous studies, the similarity between herding 
behaviour among these markets is very dissimilar. As discussed in the previous 
subchapter, it is important to note that the studies discussed have for the most part selected 
different datasets and sample periods to detect herding. Additionally, some studies have 
employed different models to assess herding. Another observation to be made, is that only 
a few studies have included the Danish market and even fewer have discussed herding in 
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Norway. This information scarcity especially from Norway affected the decision to not 
include Norway in this paper for empirical research at all.  
 
Mobarek et al. (2014) studied herding behaviour on a large variety of stock markets in 
Europe. The chosen time period for the study was 2001 to 2012. This paper was one of 
the few studies to include the Norwegian market. Their paper employed the method 
introduced by Chang et al. (2000). They found consistent evidence of low levels of 
herding occurring in Finland during the entire sample period and in varying market 
conditions. Moreover, all Nordic markets were prone to experiencing low levels of 
herding in market stress situations when they are summed together. Another observation 
they made was that the level of herding in Nordic countries was more pronounced during 
the Euro crisis than in the Financial crisis. A reason to why this happened was because of 
the bailout payments made to Greece, especially by Finland.  Their results were consistent 
with finding herding occurring in European, and especially Nordic markets, in days of 
low volatility and bear-market conditions. Mobarek et al. (2014) did not split the sample 
period up into smaller subsamples, where individual years could have been inspected this 
separation would have made the assessment of herding more detailed in the sense of 
examining it for individual years. Mobarek et al. (2014) 
 
The results from Mobarek et al. (2014) are inconsistent with results from Hwang and 
Salmon (2004, 2009, 2012) who observed that herding was more likely to occur in bull-
market conditions. The difference and inconsistency in results could however be 
explained by the difference in the selected markets and the method chosen to conduct the 
study. Mobarek et al. (2014) utilised the same stock indices from Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark as this paper will. The results from this paper will be discussed in chapter 8. 
(Mobarek et al. 2014) 
 
Some minor evidence and comparison of results can be derived from discussion papers 
and masters’ theses, which have investigated the Nordic markets. Saastamoinen (2008) 
researched herding on Finnish large-cap stocks. His sample period was between 2002-
2007. Saastamoinen (2008) found herding in Finland to be more likely to occur in a bear-
market situation. Ohlson (2010) researched herding on the Swedish stock market. His 
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sample period was from 1998 to 2009. Evidence from the paper pointed to Swedish 
investors herding on up-market days and with large-cap companies. These findings of 
herding on up-market days are consistent with evidence from Hwang and Salmon (2004). 
Lindhe (2012) was one of the few who studied herding on all four Nordic stock markets. 
Her research found herding to be consistent in Finland in the early 2000’s, but herding 
was not detected for any other country for the entire sample period of 2001-2012 (Lindhe 
2012). She also found that Nordic markets herd around international markets and here her 
results were consistent with Chiang and Zheng (2010), who suggested that investors in 
advanced markets might herd around bigger international markets due to the pronounced 
value of some information. Lindhe (2012) utilised the same methodology as this paper 
later will, but her dataset is different. Rissanen (2015) employed the beta-coefficient- and 
the nonlinear method to examine herding in Finland. His sample period was from 1999 
to 2014. His results display that, whilst using the beta-coefficient method, significant 
herding could not be detected in Finland for the entire sample period. When utilising the 
nonlinear method, he found consistent evidence of herding occurring in Finland for the 
entire sample period and especially in bull-market conditions and large-cap companies. 
 
To sum up the results from the Nordic markets, one can argue that Finland does 
experience herding to at least some degree. Other markets have seen inconsistent results, 
and this most likely demonstrates that other Nordic markets do no experience herding. 
The inconsistency in results cannot entirely be explained by the use of different models 
as, for example, Mobarek et al. (2014) and Lindhe (2012) used practically the same 
method to assess herding but with varying results. Most studies have, however, utilised 
already dated data and did not separate the individual years of the sample period into 
smaller subsamples. This separation would have made it easier to pinpoint if a certain 
year mangled the results to display significant herding occurring for the entire sample 
period. And even though some studies utilised similar methods to detect herding they did 
use different datasets. Some investigated the stock indices of the most traded stocks in a 
country, where as others tried to include all stocks in the selected countries. 
 
Another observation from examining these studies is that, there really is a scarcity of 
studies to examine, which have researched herding in the Nordic stock markets. This lack 
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of studies can be explained simply by the disinterest from international researchers in 
Nordic markets. Nordic markets can be seen as unimportant and small when comparing 
them to other international markets and thus do not receive as much attention as other 
markets. This lack of studies, however, motivates this study to research the Nordic stock 
markets as they definitely have not been extensively studied and novel findings entirely 
exhausted. 
 
 
5.3. Hypotheses development 
 
Hypotheses based on previous studies and literature are formed. Firstly, efficient market 
hypothesis suggests that stock returns and their dispersions should be normally 
distributed. Market anomalies suggest that this is not the case and stock return dispersions 
are driven away from their expected values precisely because of market anomalies. 
Herding being one of the anomalies and the anomaly under inspection in this study, it is 
only natural to inspect whether or not stock return dispersions are normally distributed or 
not.  Any prevalence of the contrary would suggest that the three markets are not efficient 
and something, be it a market event or an anomaly, drives this. Thus, the null hypothesis 
is as follows: 
 
H0: Stock return dispersions are normally distributed among separate Finnish, Swedish 
and Danish markets during the sample period of 2007-2018. 
 
The first hypothesis examines the anomaly of interest in this study: Herding. The 
hypothesis inspects, if herding does indeed occur during the chosen sample period of 
2007-2018. The objective of the hypothesis is to address herding as a market-wide 
phenomenon for each separate country for the entire inspected sample period, or even 
more simply to see if herding does occur on these three markets. Hence, the first 
hypothesis is the following: 
 
H1: Herding occurs in the Finnish, Swedish and Danish stock markets for the entire 
sample period of 2007-2018. 
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The second hypothesis inspects herding during separate years of the sample period. The 
objective is to see if international and even global events affected the levels of herding in 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Hwang and Salmon (2004, 2009, 2012) and others 
(Christie and Huang 1995; Bikchandani and Sharma 2001) have provided evidence that 
herding dynamics change during market crisis situations. This is why this study also aims 
to reveal whether there is a difference in herding behaviour between separate years. The 
hypothesis to inspect this phenomenon and occurrence is the following: 
 
H2: Herding occurs differently in different subperiods in the Finnish, Swedish and Danish 
stock markets for the chosen sample period of 2007-2018. 
 
Additionally, herding behaviour has been seen to sometimes be asymmetrical especially 
in developing markets (Mobarek et al. 2014). Asymmetry here means the difference of 
herding in different market conditions, i.e. up- and down-market days. Evidence from 
previous papers motivates this study to also include an examination of asymmetry in 
herding in the three selected markets. Thus, the third hypothesis is formed to be the 
following: 
 
H3: Herding behaviour occurs differently in rising and declining market conditions across 
different markets during the sample period of 2007-2018. 
 
Lastly, the influence of bigger markets on smaller markets is also acknowledged similarly 
to prior studies (Chiang and Zheng 2010; Mobarek et al. 2014). Thus, the influence of the 
US and German markets on the three Nordic markets are tested. Hence, the fourth 
hypothesis is the following: 
 
H4: Finland, Sweden and Denmark separately herd around the US and the German 
markets during the sample period of 2007-2018. 
 
The next chapter explains the chosen methodology for the study in order to reject or 
accept the afore listed hypotheses. 
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6. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This study assesses herding from a market-wide approach. This form of herding 
behaviour is present when investors abandon and ignore the individual characteristics of 
assets and follow the market consensus (Henker et al. 2006). The study will not try to 
detect herding on individual stocks or selected industries. The method will include 
examining three separate markets, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and their individual 
stock markets. The proxy for the market will be each separate country’s stock index of 
most traded stocks.  
  
The nonlinear regression model equations (6) and (7) are chosen to conduct this study. 
This empirical approach follows the method and study of Chiang and Zheng (2010). The 
approach implies a non-linear relationship between dispersions of individual asset or 
stock returns compared to the full market portfolio return. Moreover, this particular 
method is chosen because the framework for assessing herding has been established by 
it. Furthermore, this methodology has been successfully used by prior studies to discover 
the presence of herding. Another advantage of this model and methodology is that it is 
relatively simple and easy to utilise and carry out the testing for the study. The equations, 
which are already mentioned before in this study are again listed below for convenience: 
 
(6)  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷< = FG∑ 𝑁5JF |𝑅5< − 𝑅*<| 
 
 
(7)  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷< = 𝛼 + 𝛾F𝑅*< + 𝛾N|𝑅*<| + 𝛾O𝑅*<N + 𝜀< 
 
The coefficient of particular interest is still the non-linear component 𝛾O. A negative and 
statistically significant coefficient demonstrates the occurrence of market wide herding. 
These equations are used for the assessment of H1 and H2, where the study examines the 
occurrence of herding as a market wide phenomenon for the entire sample period and also 
for subsample periods. For the second hypothesis yearly data is inserted to each equation 
to examine herding in yearly subperiods.  
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(8)  	𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷< = 𝛼 + 𝛾F(1 − 𝐷)𝑅*< + 𝛾N(𝐷)𝑅*< + 𝛾O(1 − 𝐷)𝑅*<N + 𝛾Q(𝐷)𝑅*<N + 𝜀< 	
For the purpose of examining herding in different market conditions equation 8 is 
introduced to the study. Many prior studies have found asymmetry in herding during up-
and down-market days (Tan et al., 2008; Chiang and Zheng, 2010).  Prior literature 
motivates this study as well to demonstrate if rising or declining Finnish, Swedish and 
Danish markets experience asymmetrical herding.  This equation is used to test H3. 
 
The dummy variable (D) in the equation is equal to one, if index returns are negative and 
the variable is zero, if index returns are not negative. A negative and statistically 
significant 𝛾O constitutes as herding occurring on up-market days. Similarly, a negative 
and statistically significant 𝛾Q would be consistent with herding occurring in down-market 
days.  
 
(9)  	𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷< = 𝛼 + 𝛾F𝑅*< + 𝛾N|𝑅*<| + 𝛾O𝑅*<N + 𝛾Q𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷RS,< +	𝛾U𝑅RS,*<N +	𝜀< 
 
(10)  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷< = 𝛼 + 𝛾F𝑅*< + 𝛾N|𝑅*<| + 𝛾O𝑅*<N + 𝛾Q𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷V9@,< +	𝛾U𝑅V9@,*<N +	𝜀< 
 
The fourth hypothesis is tested with the afore listed regression model equations (9) and 
(10). Acknowledging the findings and suggestions of Chiang and Zheng (2010), where 
the US market influences smaller markets, this study also inspects the impact of the US 
and additionally the German market in regard to herding in the three Nordic markets. The 
German market is introduced similarly to the study of Mobarek et al. (2014), who 
recognised its influence on other European markets. In addition to equation (7) the CSAD 
measure is equated for both the US and the German market. Also, the market returns of 
both of these markets are needed and equated. 
 
This method relays three coefficients of interest. First, a negative and statistically 
significant 𝛾O is consistent with market-wide herding on one of the three examined 
markets occurring, when the influence of another market (the US or Germany) is 
introduced to the regression. Secondly, a positive and statistically significant value of 𝛾Q 
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displays that stock return dispersions from either the US or Germany affecting the market 
under inspection. Thirdly and most importantly, a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient 𝛾U is consistent with the examined country herding around either the US or 
the German market. 
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7. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
7.1. Data 
 
Data for this study is predominantly gathered from Nasdaq OMX Nordic. The data set 
consists of the most liquid shares of the main indices of Finland (OMXH25), Sweden 
(OMXS30) and Denmark (OMXC20). For testing the fourth hypothesis, and the effect of 
the US and German markets on the three Nordic markets, additional data is gathered from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The S&P500 index is used to test the influence of the US 
market. The influence of the German market is tested by utilising data from the DAX30 
index. Daily prices for all indices and stocks from the indices are used. The time period 
chosen is from the 1.1.2007 to 31.12.2017. All data and prices are in local currencies as 
the study concentrates on assessing herding on separate markets and does not include an 
examination of herding between markets. For S&P500 and DAX30 indices the daily 
index prices are converted into the local currencies of Finland (EUR), Sweden (SEK) and 
Denmark (DKK). Initially the study was meant to include the Norwegian market as well, 
but comparable data could not be gathered from the same source as the other markets, 
and that is why the Norwegian market is left out. Additionally, the Norwegian market is 
left out of this study because there is clearly a lack of studies and research to compare 
empirical results to. 
 
Another notion to be remarked is that the chosen indices have had structural changes to 
them during the chosen time period. Some stocks have been removed and others 
introduced to the indices. To account for this fluctuation of assets, the stock returns for 
assets which were no longer constituents of the index as of 31.12.2017 but had been for 
at least some of the sample period, a neutral value is given to them (i.e. those days, for 
those particular stocks, are given the same lognormal return as the average of the market 
portfolio). This decision is made because, yet again comparable data for the removed 
stocks could not be assumed from the same data source. Daily stock returns are equated 
by using daily changes in closing prices by the following formula:  
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(11)  𝑅<J100 ∗ (log(𝑃<) − log(𝑃<]F)) 
 𝑅<J   Change in stocks daily closing price from day t-1 to day t (𝑃<)=  Stocks price at time t 
 
The required market portfolio for the CSAD measure for each index is equally weighted, 
meaning that each stock within the portfolio has an equal weight. Each stock index has at 
least 2750 observations. Even though the time period is the same for each stock index the 
number of observations vary from 2751 to 2766. This difference in observations or 
trading days is due to various reasons, one of which is for example national holidays 
which occur at different times for the selected markets and affect trading days. 
 
 
7.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the CSAD measure and the market returns 
for each of the three selected markets. Denmark shows a higher median and standard 
deviation for the CSAD measure than Finland and Sweden. Chiang and Zheng (2010) 
suggest that a higher standard deviation in similar markets may be caused by the market 
experiencing unexpected news or shocks more frequently. Finland seems to display the 
lowest measure of CSAD suggesting that it experienced the least amount of unexpected 
shocks or news. The differences of the CSAD measure are relatively large as Finland has 
a range of 0-1,784 and Sweden has a range of 0-3,212. There is also a difference in stock 
returns for each market. Finland minimum value for stock returns is -3,868 and for 
Denmark the corresponding value is -5,091. This would mean that there is difference 
between the selected markets. It will be interesting to see how variously herding 
behaviour occurs in these different markets. 
 
Additionally, the skewness and kurtosis measures for CSAD are positive for all markets. 
Also, kurtosis is above three which indicates that all three markets have stock returns 
which are not normally distributed. The null hypothesis stated that stock return 
dispersions are normally distributed among separate Finnish, Swedish and Danish 
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markets. Evidence from Table 1 suggests the contrary. Thus, the null hypothesis is 
rejected for all markets, as the stock return dispersions for Finland, Sweden and Denmark 
do not follow a normal distribution. 
 
Figure 2. represents the historical stock market development for the chosen time period 
of 2007-2018. The selected time period includes huge market shocks in form of the 
Financial Crisis and the Euro Crisis. These two occurrences can be seen as drops in all of 
the three markets in 2008 and 2011. The proximity and similarity of the markets can be 
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seen in the index developments of the three stock indices. From a swift assessment and 
analysis, it can be seen that all the three markets experienced similar although not 
perfectly parallel comovements and fluctuations. Denmark experienced the greatest surge 
for the entire time period and Finland experienced the steepest decline during the 
Financial Crisis. Moreover, the Euro Crisis of 2012 affected Finland more severely, which 
could have been caused by Finland being the only country to have euros as the local 
currency.  The findings of Figure 2 suggest that Denmark recovered from the Financial 
Crisis faster and was less affected by the Euro Crisis than the other two markets. 
Denmark’s immunity to international financial shocks and the ability to recover from 
them quickly will be interesting to compare to herding behaviour in the next chapter of 
the study. Can Denmark prove to be immune to such a market anomaly as well? 
Comparatively, if this argument is made, Finland, who experienced the greatest decline, 
should be more susceptible to herding than the other two markets. 
 
 
Figure 2. Historical index developments for OMXH25, OMXS30 and OMXC20 
OMXH25 OMXS30 
OMXC20 
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Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship of CSAD and stock market return for the three stock 
indices. Figure 3 displays the relationship for the entire time period and Figure 4 displays 
the linearity or nonlinearity of the relationship. A nonlinear relationship between the 
individual dispersions and the stock returns would indicate market-wide herding. Figure 
3 demonstrates that the Finnish and Danish stock indices seem to have proportionate and 
linear fluctuations in CSAD and the index return. This can be seen as simultaneous 
movements in both measures across the time period. Interestingly for Sweden, a stark rise 
in the CSAD measure seems to anticipate large index fluctuations. Evidence from this 
can be seen especially in the years 2008 and 2001 where the CSAD measure rises before 
fluctuations in stock returns. Denmark has the most proportionate movements between 
the two measures suggesting that the Danish stock market experiences the lowest levels 
of herding.  
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between CSAD and stock returns for the time period 
OMXH25 OMXS30 
OMXC20 
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Figure 4 demonstrates that the relationship between the cross-sectional absolute deviation 
and the different stock index returns. Denmark clearly demonstrates a linear relationship, 
again suggesting that herding does not occur on the market. Sweden and Finland however 
do not seem to have a linear relationship between cross-sectional absolute deviations and 
the stock index returns. Sweden especially shows a larger dispersion suggesting that it is 
the most susceptible market to experience herding. 
 
In regard to the descriptive data alone, it is evident that the three markets chosen for this 
study react differently to market movements and have varying stock returns and stock 
returns dispersions. This will make interpreting and examining the empirical results of 
the next chapter more interesting and intriguing. The varying results of this chapter and 
the difference of descriptive data should translate into differences between herding in the 
Finnish, Swedish and Danish markets.  
  
 
Figure 4. Relationship between CSAD and stock returns 
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8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
This section presents the results of the estimated regressions. These results will then be 
used to inspect hypotheses H1-H4 and further utilised to either accept or reject them as 
per market separately within each subchapter. The results of each regression estimates 
will be split into separate subchapters in order to inspect the results for each hypothesis 
more deliberately and meticulously. The first subchapter will inspect herding across the 
entire sample period of 2007-2018. The second chapter will assess herding for separate 
years during the sample period and the third chapter will examine herding during various 
market conditions in up- and down-market days. Lastly, the fourth chapter will assess if 
the selected markets herd around the US or German market. 
 
 
8.1.  Herding across the entire sample period for separate markets 
 
Table 2 displays the results for herding during entire sample period for the separate 
markets of Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Equations (6) and (7) and utilised to obtain 
the regression results.  As mentioned afore, the coefficient 𝛾O is the variable of interest, 
where a negative and statistically significant value indicates the presence of market-wide 
herding. 
 
According to the results of Table 2 none of the selected markets display market-wide 
herding. This would suggest that investors in all markets don’t ignore the individual 
characteristics of stocks and additionally do not blindly follow the market performance. 
Sweden is the only market to even display a negative value, but it is still insignificant. 
Previous studies have also reached mixed results, and thus the results here are not 
surprising.  The results are consistent with some prior studies but also inconsistent with 
others.   
 
Consistent results and evidence derive from at least Saastamoinen (2008), Chiang et al. 
(2000) and Henker et al. (2006), who found no market-wide herding in advanced and 
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developed markets. Conversely however, many studies have indeed found market-wide 
herding in Nordic and developed markets (Chiang and Zheng 2010; Hwang and Salmon 
2004; Lindhe 2012). Some of the inconsistencies could be explained with the difference 
in data and the sample period. None of studies mentioned in this paragraph utilised data 
from the three indices chosen for this particular study.  However, what is interesting and 
surprising is that the results are only partially consistent with results from Mobarek et al. 
(2014). 
 
 
Of all the studies mentioned in chapter 5, the study of Mobarek et al. (2014) was the only 
one that obtained data from the same indices as this study. Their results displayed 
significant market-wide herding in the Finnish market (statistically significant at the 10% 
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level). Remarkably their study did not find market-wide herding occurring on Swedish or 
Danish markets. An explanation to the partially inconsistent results might lie in the 
selected sample period for both studies. Mobarek et al. (2014) had a sample period of 
2001-2012 and this study inspected the time period of 2007-2018. This could suggestively 
indicate that all Nordic markets have developed and become more efficient as time has 
passed. Investors don’t abandon their initial vision but still assess individual stocks and 
don’t follow the performance of the market. 
 
The results displayed in Table 2 reject the first hypothesis, which stated that herding 
occurs in the Finnish, Swedish and Danish stock markets for the entire sample period. 
None of the markets displayed significant herding during the time span of 2007-2018.  
What will be intriguing to inspect are the results for the separate subsamples, where each 
year of the entire sample period is assessed separately.  
 
 
8.2.  Herding across separate yearly subsamples 
 
Table 3 displays the results for the regression estimates of herding for separate years of 
the entire sample period. Equations (6) and (7) and utilised to obtain the regression results.  
As for Table 2 the coefficient 𝛾O is the variable of interest, where a negative and 
statistically significant value still indicates the presence of market-wide herding. This 
method allows the study to obtain results for individual years and to see if herding is more 
pronounced in periods of large market fluctuations, for example the Financial Crisis of 
2008 or the Euro Crisis of 2012. Furthermore, Christie and Huang (1995) suggested that 
herding would be more intensive during turbulent conditions or periods of market stress.  
 
From results obtained from Table 3, it can be seen that there is only one negative and 
statistically significant finding. According to the regression results, Sweden displayed 
market-wide herding in 2013. All other years for all of the selected markets do not display 
significant herding for separate years. What is noteworthy, is that the results indicate that 
during the Financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, Finland and Sweden display negative 
coefficients although they are insignificant. Additionally, Finland individually displays  
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an insignificant variable for 2012 during the Euro crisis. It must be stressed that these 
findings are insignificant, but they could provide at least some minor proof of investors 
tending more towards herding in turbulent bear-market conditions than in stable or bull-
market conditions.  
 
Further minor evidence of consistent results come from the prior studies of Ohlson (2010) 
and Lindhe (2012), whom also obtained results for separate years. Neither found market-
wide herding occurring during the overlapping time periods with this study. In this sense 
the results here are not a surprise but rather expected. In addition, the results here are also 
consistent with the previous results of this study, where Finland and Denmark displayed 
no market-wide herding and where Sweden was the only market to display some tendency 
towards herding during the entire sample period.  
 
With regression estimates and results obtained from Table 3 we accept the second 
hypotheses for Sweden but reject it for Finland and Denmark. The hypothesis stated that 
herding occurs differently in different subperiods in the Finnish, Swedish and Danish 
stock markets. Herding only occurred significantly differently in Sweden for the year 
2013. For the other markets market-wide herding was not seen in separate years. Thus, 
the markets of Finland and Denmark perform consistently and indifferently in regard to 
herding during separate years during the time period of 2007-2018. 
 
Many prior studies have inspected the asymmetry of herding in up- and down-market 
days (Saastamoinen, 2008; Mobarek et al., 2014). The next chapter will assess herding 
during these different market conditions. So far only Sweden has displayed market-wide 
herding occurring during the sample period of 2007-2018 and thus it should be curious to 
see if the results change. 
 
 
8.3.  Herding in up- and down-markets  
 
Table 4 displays the results for the regression estimates of herding during rising and 
declining markets during 2007-2018 for the selected markets. The equation (8) is applied 
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to this method. The coefficients of interest in regard to herding are 𝛾O and 𝛾Q. A negative 
and significant coefficient 𝛾O is consistent with herding occurring during up-market days 
and a negative and significant coefficient 𝛾Q is consistent with herding occurring during 
down-market days. 
 
 
The results obtained from Table 4 demonstrate the same consistent results as previous 
findings of this study. The results are similar for all the selected markets, where Denmark 
and Finland do not display market-wide herding. Table 4 results display that again only 
Sweden displays market-wide herding. From the results of regression estimates, Sweden 
displays market-wide herding occurring more probably on down-market days. Panel B 
represents the results from a conducted Wald test to examine the equality of herding 
coefficients and to see whether there is significant asymmetry in herding in the tested 
markets. The hypothesis tested is  𝛾O= 𝛾Q. Asymmetry would be consistent with a negative 
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and statistically significant value in the difference between 𝛾O and 𝛾Q. The results 
displayed in Panel B show that there is no significant asymmetry in herding in either of 
the three markets. The results are consistent with Chiang and Zheng (2010), who also 
found no herding asymmetry in advanced markets. Notably all selected countries display 
similar results from the Wald test. Further examination should be conducted in the future 
to verify whether or not the results are robust for the equality of herding coefficients.  
 
The result consistencies in comparison to previous studies are mixed. Saastamoinen 
(2008) found evidence of herding occurring during up-market days in Finland. Mobarek 
et al. (2014) found evidence for herding behaviour during down-market days for Finland 
and Sweden.  Alas, the study does have consistent results for Sweden but inconsistent 
results for Finland when comparing to previous studies. The difference in results could 
be explained by both the difference in sample period and difference of used data for 
Saastamoinen (2008). Interestingly Chiang and Zheng (2010) found no asymmetry of 
herd behaviour for developed markets. This would suggest that Sweden is not seen as a 
developed or advanced market in regard to herd behaviour asymmetry, but the other two 
selected markets are. Mobarek et al. (2014) provide that another explanation to this 
phenomenon might be the panic reaction of Swedish investors. This behavioural 
characteristic of investors could suggest that Swedish investors stress and panic during 
declining markets and abandon separate stock assessments and tend to follow the market 
performance. This herding behaviour could be caused by the unintentional panicky 
reaction or due to a variety of rational reasons, for example reputational loss which was 
explained in lengthy detail in chapter 2 of this study. 
 
In regard to the third hypothesis “Herding behaviour occurs differently in rising and 
declining market conditions across different markets” it can be said that the third 
hypothesis is rejected for Finland and Denmark who displayed no asymmetry in declining 
or rising market conditions.  Both countries displayed insignificant herding in up- and 
down-market days. Conversely Sweden displayed herding behaviour in down-market 
days and thus the third hypothesis is accepted for Sweden. 
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8.4.   Herding around US and European markets 
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Motivated by prior studies (Chiang and Zheng 2010; Mobarek et al. 2014, etc.), it is also 
examined here whether or not the selected Nordic markets herd around larger markets. 
The influence of US and German markets on the three Nordic markets are introduced to 
the regression separately and according to equations (9) and (10) respectfully. Table 5 
displays the results for the regression estimates of herding around the US and German 
markets for Finland, Sweden and Denmark. 
 
A negative and statistically significant coefficient 𝛾O displays market wide herding 
occurring for the examined markets. Only Sweden displays significant herding, when the 
influence of the US market is added to the regression. The results are consistent with 
evidence gathered in this study, where Sweden has been the only market to show signs of 
herding. Finland or Denmark still continue to not show market-wide herding happening 
when taking into account the influence of bigger markets.  
 
Results displayed in Table 5 demonstrate that stock return dispersions from the US and 
Germany have a highly significant effect on all Nordic markets. The coefficient 𝛾Q is 
positive and statistically significant for all markets at least at a 5% significance level. 
Hence, all of three countries, Finland, Sweden and Denmark show evidence of market 
conditions from the US and Germany affecting their own local stock markets.  
 
Interestingly only Denmark shows statistically significant evidence of herding around US 
and German markets. Table 5 displays that the coefficient 𝛾U is negative and statistically 
significant for Denmark only. This study does find evidence of herding around US or 
German markets for Finland or Sweden. These results are partly consistent with the 
findings of Chiang and Zheng (2010), who recognised the importance of especially the 
US market internationally. Inconsistency with results arise from the findings from Finnish 
and Swedish markets, which do not seem to herd around bigger markets. 
 
The fourth hypothesis assessed the impact of the US and German markets on Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark in regard to herding behaviour. The only market to show evidence 
of herding around an international market was Denmark and thus the fourth hypothesis is 
accepted for Denmark. The fourth hypothesis is rejected for Finland and Sweden as they 
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did not display evidence of significant herding around the markets of the US and 
Germany. 
 
 
8.5.  Herding results 
 
The results here are mostly consistent for the entire study where Sweden has displayed 
characteristics of herding during the entire sample period. Sweden has also displayed 
herding during separate subsample periods and herding behaviour in down-market days. 
Sweden, however, did not display evidence of herding around international markets. This 
suggests that the first three hypotheses concerning herding are accepted for Sweden and 
the fourth hypothesis is rejected. 
 
The results are partially consistent with Finland and Denmark, which have displayed no 
domestic herding occurring during the entire sample period. Neither of the markets have 
displayed herding in up- or down-market days or in separate years. Hence, all four of the 
hypotheses for this study are rejected for Finland. Denmark has displayed herding around 
the German and US market. Thus, the first three hypotheses are rejected for Denmark as 
it does not experience domestic herding, but the fourth hypothesis is accepted because 
Denmark does herd around international markets.  
 
The next section will draw a conclusion for the entire paper and subjects discussed. 
Finally, the results will shortly be summed into seeing what contribution this paper 
provides. 
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9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
This paper’s starting remark by Russell (1901) illustrates how the herd instinct and 
herding behaviour is a ferocious, primordial and in every aspect an animalistic act. This 
negative association of herding in regard to human behaviour is logical – why would 
anyone want to resemble an animal? It is arguable that especially an investor would not 
enjoy being compared to a blind sheep following a herd of other sheep. The objective of 
investing and partaking in the stock market is to many, at least to some degree, a game 
where you lose, or you win. How can then herding be a positive or dare say logical act?  
 
The notion and occurrence of herding has been studied by countless different fields of 
science and research. In addition to the remarked economists in this study, a plethora of 
neurologists, psychologists and philosophers have studied the human behaviour of 
herding (Spyros 2014). The Finnish language has an extremely apt proverb in context of 
this study, which can loosely be translated into English to mean “stupidity condenses in 
a group”. Can this sentiment then be applied to the financial market? Does an individual 
investor often abandon his or her own ideas and decide to follow the group or market 
consensus, which in this regard would render and alter him into a stupid investor? 
 
Conversely, the opposite may bare a truer image of a herding investor. An investor 
displaying herding behaviour may actually rather wittingly and rationally follow the 
common market consensus. An investor might see a definitive reputational hazard in 
acting against a common sentiment. He or she could also face an employment problem if 
the risk of repelling market consensus is realised. The division of herding established by 
Bikhchandi and Sharma (2001) and Spyros (2014) commendably explain this aspect of 
herding. Herding should not only be seen as a negative and bestial affair but rather also 
as a rational act of human intellect. 
 
The study of herding was begun by Lakonishok et al. in 1992, when they assessed herding 
around fund manager behaviour. They found herding to exist intensely within small-cap 
companies, which could be explained by the lack of information from smaller companies. 
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Later the empirical framework for studying herding on stock markets was contrived by 
Christie and Huang (1995). Their method assessed herding by examining the standard 
deviation of returns. Their study consisted of assessing stock markets at high stress levels 
and when market fluctuations were elevated. The two researches could not find concrete 
and significant evidence of herding from the US stock market between the years 1925-
1988. They concluded that investors followed the efficient market theory where asset 
pricing was correct. 
 
Christie and Huang’s (1995) empirical model was later expanded and arguably bettered 
by Chang et al. (2000), who saw the linearity of Christie and Huang’s (1995) model to 
be, to at least some extent, flawed. Chang et al. (2000) added a nonlinear component to 
the model as they saw and suggested that levels of herding are not constant. Instead they 
stated that the levels of herding change exponentially in different market conditions. They 
reported evidence of emerging markets displaying significant intentional herding.  
 
The model of Chang et al. (2000) has later been used by countless studies for a variety of 
reasons. It is easy to utilise, it can detect herding on varying market fluctuations and 
situation and not only in stable markets like the method employed by Christie and Huang 
(1995). Chiang and Zheng (2010) only slightly modified this method to include a variable 
for investor behaviour asymmetry. This method of Chiang and Zheng (2010) gives the 
researcher a better and great tool to assess herding in stock markets and it is also utilised 
in this study.  
 
Another approach to investigate and examine herding was introduced by Hwang and 
Salmon (2004). They approached herding from an entirely different perspective. Hwang 
and Salmon (2004) examined the fluctuations in beta-coefficients between different 
market periods. Additionally, Hwang and Salmon (2004) defined herding in a novel way 
compared to other previous researchers. They argued that herding is the phenomenon or 
act of an investor following market indicators, for example macro-economic 
announcements, news coverage or earnings announcements to converge from his or her 
initial sentiment and follow a new market sentiment. Hwang and Salmon’s (2004) study 
displayed the same evidence as Chang et al. (2000) where they found herding behaviour 
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in emerging markets. Moreover, Hwang and Salmon (2004) demonstrated that herding 
occurred during bull-markets and a significant but diminishing amount of herding 
occurred in bear-markets.  
 
Evidently, proof of herding from core studies about herding is mixed. Most results are 
tied by the methodology chosen for the study and that makes most studies incomparable 
between each other.  Some comparison can however be derived from analysing studies 
which utilised the same methodology. Not all obstacles are removed, because therein 
however lies a problem with the used data. Most studies utilise different data from 
different markets and this makes comparing and gathering consistent results hard and 
challenging.  
 
The method employed in this study, the Chiang and Huang (2010) nonlinear method, has 
luckily been used as the main model to assess herding in the Nordic countries (Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway). Most of these studies are however masters’ theses and only 
provide minor proof. Even so in having the same methodology, the results are still 
inconclusive and make a decisive verdict impossible to reach. This of course could be 
simply explained by the difference in datasets as apparently no study has had exactly the 
same data than another study. Additionally, studies have seemed to disregard the Danish 
and Norwegian markets as only a handful of studies could be found for this paper. Even 
this study failed to find comparable data of the Norwegian market in order to utilise it for 
the Nordic section of the study. Now only Finland, Sweden and Denmark were included 
in this study. 
 
The previous studies discussed in this paper concerning the Finnish stock market consist 
of Saastamoinen (2008) and Mobarek et al. (2014). Further minor proof is given by a pair 
of masters’ theses by Lindhe (2012) and Rissanen (2015). These previous studies, with 
exception of Rissanen (2015), suggest that some herding can be found on the Finnish 
stock market. Rissanen (2015) was however the only one to employ the beta coefficient 
model.  
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This paper did not use the beta-coefficient model but the same model as most other studies 
for the Finnish stock market. What results from regression estimates suggest is that during 
the sample period of 2007-2018 from the OMXH25 index is that Finland does not 
experience herding. No herding could be found during the entire time period. Nor could 
it be found during individual years. Furthermore, herding behaviour was not present for 
Finland during up- or down-market days separately and the results for herding were 
symmetric for both. The difference in data cannot be used as a sole explanation to this 
discrepancy. Mobarek et al. (2014) also used the OMXH25 index to assess herding in 
Finnish stock markets. What was different was the time period for their sample. Mobarek 
et al. (2014) used the sample period of 2001-2012, which is relatively earlier than the 
sample period of this study. 
 
From inspecting the assembly of studies conducted in Finland it would seem that studies 
with sample periods from the early 2000’s found evidence of herding in Finnish stock 
markets no matter which data or method was employed. Furthermore, later studies, which 
included data primarily from the 2010’s and had separated it into individual years did not 
find evidence of herding after the year 2007. Mobarek et al. (2014) used the same dataset 
as this study and hence it truly is a shame and a pity that Mobarek et al. (2014) did not 
provide a separation of subsamples indicating herding during individual years. These 
results could have been compared with this study to see, if their results for detecting 
herding on the Finnish stock market derived from the early 2000’s and whether or not 
there was lack of herding in the latter part of their sample period. 
 
What this observation of herding occurring during the early 2000’s could suggest, is that 
the Finnish stock market has developed during the 21st century and acts more accordingly 
to the efficient market theory, where anomalies and investor behaviours don’t play as 
large a role as in previous years. This observation would be consistent with the findings 
of previous studies, although it must be remarked that comparison to earlier studies only 
provide minor evidence as some of them are indeed master’s theses. 
 
Studies conducted on other Nordic markets also have varying results. Again, it is 
noteworthy to mention that only a few studies have been carried out in the Danish and 
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Norwegian markets, and Norway was entirely secluded from this paper for the lack of 
data. Additionally, most studies conducted in Sweden have been master’s theses and the 
results from them only provide minor evidence and do not bear significant weight in 
reaching a conclusion of herding occurring on the Nordic markets. But it is still interesting 
to see how the results of this study compare to other studies.  
 
Mobarek et al. (2014) did not find herding occurring in Swedish or Danish markets for 
their sample period even though they utilised the same indices as this study. The result 
for regression estimates from this study are consistent with no herding occurring in 
Denmark for the entire sample period or for individual years and up- and down-markets. 
The lack of asymmetry between market conditions is consistent with the findings of 
Chiang and Zheng (2010) who suggest that advanced markets should not experience 
asymmetric herding. Denmark, additionally to herding, seemed to be immune to market 
shocks and recovered from crises more rapidly than the other two markets. Additional 
consistency and evidence with prior studies is derived from Denmark herding around 
international markets (Mobarek et al., 2014). 
 
Where the results are not consistent are with Sweden. This study found that Sweden 
experienced herding during the sample period and specifically in 2013. Also, Sweden was 
more likely to experience herding in down-market days, which actually is consistent with 
the results of Mobarek et al. (2014) and other studies which suggest asymmetry between 
herding between declining and ascending markets (Tan et al., 2008; Ohlson, 2010). 
However, the asymmetry of herding between different market conditions was not 
significant, even though down-market days were more likely to experience herding. The 
partial difference in results could again be explained by the different sample periods as 
Mobarek et al. (2014) did not include the year 2013, where this study found that Sweden 
experienced significant herding. Further minor contradiction to the results come from the 
masters’ theses of Ohlson (2010) and Lindhe (2012) who did not find herding occurring 
on Swedish markets.  
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9.1.  Conclusion 
 
To summarise herding behaviour is not consistent between Nordic markets and there is a 
difference between the three selected markets. Sweden was the only market to experience 
herding behaviour. This was especially displayed in 2013 and on down-market days. 
However, Denmark was the only market to display herding behaviour around 
international markets. Finland was the only market to not display herding under any of 
the tested regressions. The study’s results are mostly consistent with studies conducted 
during a similar time period but inconsistent with studies during an earlier time period.  
 
This study has contributed to the scientific community by providing further research on 
investor herding behaviour on the Nordic markets of Finland, Sweden and Denmark. It 
has provided novel findings especially in Sweden and gathered an important observation 
of detecting a possibly shift in herding behaviour as time has passed especially for the 
Finnish stock market. 
 
With these findings, may the research for herding continue along with assessment of 
human behaviour and decision making. 
 
 
9.2.  Consideration for future research 
 
Suggestions for future studies include utilising a longer sample period starting from the 
early 2000’s and seeing the yearly results for herding. This could provide essential 
evidence in proving how herding behaviour has changed in the Nordic markets. Also, 
more extensive research should be conducted in Danish and Norwegian markets to create 
an encompassing view of the entire Nordic stock market in regard to herding. 
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